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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2088 
____________ 
 
TARANJEET SINGH LAMBA, 
 
         Petitioner 
    
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
         Respondent 
 
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. 201-122-022) 
Immigration Judge:  Hon. Amiena A. Khan 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 17, 2016 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  April 5, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner challenges a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), 
dismissing an appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of applications for asylum 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(A), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the 
following reasons, the petition for review will be denied.    
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our 
disposition.  Taranjeet Singh Lamba filed his initial application on January 11, 2011, 
seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on political opinion and the CAT.  
Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 320, 324.  In the January 2011 application, Lamba 
attached a written statement in English, explaining that his troubles began when he 
returned back to India from the United States in March 2009.  A.R. 326.  Lamba stated 
that his family had a domestic worker named Gopal employed at their home, who had run 
away.  A.R. 326.  According to Lamba, the police came looking for Gopal, inquiring 
about the worker because he had committed “some crime like robbery.”  A.R. 326.  The 
police allegedly harassed Lamba, taking him to a police station, demanding a payment of 
50,000 Indian rupees or else they would pin Gopal’s crimes on Lamba and put Lamba in 
jail.  A.R. 326.  Lamba stated he had given the police bribes several times to “remain 
safe,” and that he did not have good relations with a local politician, which is why the 
police “torture[d]” him.  A.R. 326.  Lamba ultimately concluded, “I have to run from my 
own country for the crime I have not done and from the police who . . . in fact just help 
themselves.”  A.R. 326. 
 Subsequently, on August 30, 2011 Lamba submitted an amended application, now 
also seeking relief based on religion, in addition to political opinion.  A.R. 289.  Lamba’s 
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amended statement indicated that on March 15, 2009, police in India came to his home to 
ask about Gopal, and that “Gopal had some criminal records and he made a robbery.”  
A.R. 295.  Lamba explained that the police took him to a police station, beat him with a 
baton, slapped him, and again demanded 50,000 Indian rupees, which Lamba’s father 
paid.  A.R. 295.  Lamba claimed that the police “did this because I was a Sikh and we are 
minority in India.”  A.R. 295.  He added that they “said bad words about my religion” 
and that “I do not know why they hate my religion.”  A.R. 295.  Lamba explained that he 
“received some injuries from the police beatings” and that his “thighs and legs were 
swollen.”  A.R. 295.  Lamba stated that on two separate and subsequent occasions 
policemen came to his home, forcing him to pay 15,000 Indian rupees and 10,000 Indian 
rupees as bribes.  A.R. 295.  As recently as August 2011, police came to Lamba’s home 
in India, ordering that he be produced to the police station.  Lamba asserted that “[t]hey 
will kill me if I go back to India.”  A.R. 296.   
 On May 23, 2013, Lamba testified before the IJ through a Punjabi-language 
interpreter.  A.R. 126-28.  Lamba testified that he left India because of threats from the 
police.  A.R. 137.  He explained that police came to his home on March 15, 2009, 
looking for the domestic worker, Gopal.  A.R. 137-39.  He said he was taken to a police 
station, interrogated about Gopal, and then beaten with open hands and some sticks by 
five or six people.  A.R. 138-39.  Lamba testified that he was kept at the local precinct 
from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. and that he was released after his father paid a bribe of 50,000 
Indian rupees. A.R. 139-41.  He testified that he suffered no visible injuries but that he 
had swelling all over and bruises, although he did not seek any medical treatment.  A.R. 
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142.  In subsequent months, the police came to his home two more times, requiring his 
family give the police additional bribes of 10,000 and 15,000 Indian rupees.  A.R. 142-
43.  He testified that he could not go anywhere in India because the police are looking for 
him.  A.R. 143.  Finally, he explained that his family’s religion was Sikhism.  A.R. 144.    
 On cross-examination, Lamba answered questions about how his wife has visited 
him in the United States and returned to India without any problems.  A.R 146-48, 158-
160.  He further explained that his father was not arrested during the March 2009 incident 
because his father was “elderly” and Lamba was the “spokesman” for the family.  A.R. 
150.  When asked on cross-examination why his original application did not include 
information about being beaten with sticks and being slapped, as well as being targeted 
because of his Sikh religion, he explained that his lawyers were likely responsible for the 
omissions in his application.  A.R. 152-53.   
 Finally, the IJ asked Lamba questions directly.  In response to the IJ’s questions, 
Lamba explained for the first time that he had been accused of Gopal’s crime of robbery, 
and that he had never disclosed the criminal charge before because he “assume[d] that 
[his] connection with [Gopal] was automatic.”  A.R. 156-58.  Lamba also explained that 
the police’s interest in him was because he was Sikh and that the police may want to 
connect him with a “political group” or a “militant group” associated with Sikhs.  A.R. 
163-64. 
 In her June 26, 2013 opinion, the IJ determined that Lamba was not credible.  A.R. 
84-86.  The IJ found inconsistencies in his testimony and statements regarding the police 
arresting him because he was Sikh, as well as insufficient detail regarding the role of his 
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religion in the arrest.  A.R 84-86.  The IJ also determined that the brief detention and 
beatings, “although deplorable,” did not rise to the level of past persecution because he 
suffered no injuries that required medical treatment.  A.R. 85-87.  Paying of bribes, 
without more, was not sufficient to demonstrate past persecution.  A.R. 87.  The IJ also 
found that Lamba had not established a well-founded fear of persecution from the police 
in India.  A.R. 86-88.  The IJ explained that Lamba’s testimony that the police sought to 
connect him with Sikh militants was not supported by the record.  A.R.  88.  For similar 
reasons, the Court found Lamba failed to prove his eligibility for withholding of removal, 
as well as for CAT.  A.R. 89-92.  In sum, the IJ denied Lamba’s application and ordered 
him removed to India.  A.R. 93 
 Lamba appealed to the BIA, which upheld the IJ’s decision and dismissed the 
appeal.  A.R. 3.  The BIA held that there was no clear error in the IJ’s finding on 
Lamba’s credibility.  A.R. 4.  Similarly, the BIA held that even if credible, Lamba had 
not met his burden of proof for asylum.  A.R. 4-5.  Finally, the BIA upheld the IJ’s denial 
of withholding of removal, as well as under the CAT.  A.R. 5. 
 Lamba filed a timely petition for review of the BIA’s decision.   
II.1 
 On appeal, Lamba argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s findings that he 
was not credible, that he did not meet the burden of proof for asylum and withholding of 
removal, and that he did not meet his burden of proof for protection under CAT. 
                                              
1 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
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 To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate refugee status by 
showing “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).  “In order to establish past or future 
persecution, an applicant must show past or potential harm rising to the level of 
persecution on account of a statutorily enumerated ground that is committed by the 
government or by forces the government is unable or unwilling to control.”  Kibinda v. 
Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).  An applicant 
who has established past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear 
of persecution.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).  
 When the BIA’s decision “substantially relies” upon a decision of an Immigration 
Judge, we have jurisdiction to consider both.  Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 295-96 
(3d Cir. 2008).  We review factual findings, such as findings of persecution, for 
substantial evidence.  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2011).  We 
also review adverse credibility determinations under a substantial evidence standard.  
Kaita, 522 F.3d at 296.  Under such a standard, an adverse credibility determination 
“must be upheld on review unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B).  “Under this deferential standard, the IJ’s finding must be upheld unless 
the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Kibinda, 477 F.3d 
at 119 (quotation marks omitted).  Because Lamba filed his asylum application after May 
11, 2005, the effective date of the REAL ID Act, a credibility determination can be made 
7 
 
without regard to whether the inconsistency or falsehood goes to “the heart of the 
applicant’s claim.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  Such a credibility determination is 
based on the “totality of the circumstances” of the applicant’s demeanor, candor, and 
statements, among other relevant factors.  See id. 
 Substantial evidence supports a determination that Lamba was not credible.  
Considering the totality of the circumstances, numerous facts support a finding of adverse 
credibility.  Throughout, Lamba has been inconsistent and vague about how being Sikh 
resulted in his arrest and harassment by the police.  Lamba initially appeared to testify 
that he was arrested because the police sought the domestic worker Gopal in connection 
with a possible robbery.  Later, he testified that the police sought to accuse him of the 
underlying robbery.  Then, he testified superficially that being Sikh also played a role in 
his arrest.  These three positions are inconsistent and call his credibility into question.  
His written statements were also shifting about the role of his Sikh faith.  In his original 
application, Lamba did not claim that he was arrested and extorted because he was Sikh.  
Later, however, he asserted in his amended application that he was targeted for being 
Sikh.  Even then, his assertions about how being Sikh lead to persecution were vague and 
inconsistent.  He claimed in the amended application that the police said bad things about 
his religion.  He wrote that he was unsure why they hated his religion.  But when 
testifying, Lamba speculated in a perfunctory manner that the police would want to 
connect him with a Sikh “political” or “militant group.”  Again, he merely offered that as 
one possibility for being targeted by the police, in addition to the accusations that he was 
involved in Gopal’s possible robbery.   The fact that his Sikh father and family were not 
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targeted because of their religion, while he was, also raises credibility concerns.  The IJ 
raised other inconsistencies between his affidavits of support, written applications, and 
testimony.  Substantial evidence supports a finding that Lamba was not credible, and 
therefore, we are compelled to uphold the BIA.   
 Substantial evidence also supports the BIA and IJ’s determination that even if 
credible, Lamba did not meet his burden of proof for asylum.  Asylum may not be 
granted if the protected ground is only an “incidental” or “tangential” reason for 
persecution of an applicant.  Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 130 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Lamba’s initial application did not claim he was targeted because of his religion.  
His testimony indicated that he was targeted because of his connection to Gopal and 
involvement in the possible robbery.  When he did testify about how being Sikh factored 
into his arrest, he was vague and inconsistent about why the police would target him for 
his religion.  The BIA’s determination that he did not establish that he was arrested and 
beaten because he was Sikh cannot be disturbed.  In short, Lamba has not demonstrated a 
nexus between being Sikh and his alleged persecution.  
 The BIA found that Lamba’s alleged beatings2 by the police and bribes paid do not 
constitute past persecution for purposes of asylum because while the claimed beatings 
were repugnant, they do not rise to the level of persecution.  We need not resolve this 
issue.  See, e.g., Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005) (“While this Court 
                                              
2 There are inconsistencies in Lamba’s statements about the beatings he suffered.  His 
original application did not indicate that he was beaten by the police.  He first mentioned 
this in his amended application.  He later testified that he suffered no visible injuries, 
despite swelling and bruises, and that he did not seek any medical treatment.  A.R. 142.   
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has not yet drawn a precise line concerning where a simple beating ends and persecution 
begins, our cases suggest that isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury do not 
rise to the level of persecution.”).  As already mentioned, Lamba has not demonstrated 
his burden of proof connecting his alleged persecution with being Sikh.  Nor can the 
adverse credibility determination be disturbed.  Therefore, he has not demonstrated past 
persecution.  For similar reasons, Lamba has not independently established a well-
founded fear of future persecution.  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“To establish a well-founded fear of persecution, the alien must show both a 
subjective fear and that a reasonable person in his position would fear persecution, either 
because he would be individually singled out for persecution or because there is a pattern 
or practice in his home country of persecution against a group of which he is a member.” 
(quotation marks omitted).  The fact that his family remains behind without persecution 
also undermines a finding that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  See, e.g., 
Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Furthermore, Wong’s 
siblings and mother still live in Indonesia and practice Catholicism, undermining her 
claim to a well-founded fear of persecution in Indonesia.”), abrogated on other grounds 
by, Nbaye v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2011).  Therefore, he has not met his 
burden of proof for asylum.3   
                                              
3 For substantially the same reasons, his claim for withholding of removal also fails.  “[I]f 
an alien fails to establish the well-founded fear of persecution required for a grant of 
asylum, he or she will, by definition, have failed to establish the clear probability of 
persecution required for withholding of deportation.”  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 
469-70 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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 Finally, Lamba’s claim that the BIA and IJ erred with respect to his CAT claim4 
must also fail.  Under the CAT, an applicant has the burden of proof “to establish that it is 
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country 
of removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).5  “[A] decision-maker must review claims for 
relief under the Convention and consider relevant country conditions even where adverse 
credibility determinations have precluded relief under the INA.”  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 
338 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2003).  Lamba’s briefing on this point is limited.  He claims, 
without more, that the physical and mental abuse he suffered is torture and that the police 
threatened his family that he will be harmed if he returns.  He also offers evidence of the 
use of torture by Indian police.  But this, without more, does not demonstrate that he is 
“more likely than not” to be tortured upon return.  Both the IJ and BIA found that he has 
not been tortured in the past, and that his family remains unharmed in India.  As the IJ 
                                              
4  “Although the standard for establishing a CAT claim is more stringent than the asylum 
standard, it does not follow that a failure to meet the asylum standard necessarily 
precludes a CAT claim.”  Kibinda, 477 F.3d at 123.  We have previously explained that 
claims for CAT relief are “analytically distinct” from claims for asylum and withholding 
of removal.  Ghebrehiwot v. Att’y Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 358 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining 
that “denial of a claim for withholding of removal or asylum does not control the analysis 
of a claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture.  A claim under the 
Convention is not merely a subset of claims for either asylum or withholding of 
removal.” (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). 
   
5 “For an act to constitute torture under the Convention and the implementing 
regulations, it must be: (1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for an illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who 
has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful 
sanctions.”  Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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pointed out, Lamba never testified that the police would “kill or torture him,” only that he 
would be “arrested and possibly connected to a militant group.”  A.R. 168.6  The BIA and 
IJ found that Lamba has not demonstrated that the government in India is interested in 
him or arresting him upon return.  Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of 
relief under CAT.     
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
                                              
6 In his written amended application, however, he did state in general terms that the 
police would kill him if he returned.   
